Abstract. It is shown that the infinite-valued first-order Gödel logic G 0 based on the set of truth values {1/k : k ∈ ω \ {0}} ∪ {0} is not r.e. The logic G 0 is the same as that obtained from the Kripke semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic with constant domains and where the order structure of the model is linear. From this, the unaxiomatizability of Kröger's temporal logic of programs (even of the fragment without the nexttime operator ) and of the authors' temporal logic of linear discrete time with gaps follows.
Introduction
In [4] , Kurt Gödel introduced a sequence of finite-valued logics G n in order to show that there are infinitely many propositional systems intermediate in strength between classical and intuitionistic propositional logic. In [3] , Dummett considers the natural infinite-valued analogue LC of Gödel's systems and shows that it is axiomatized using the intuitionistic propositional calculus plus the axiom schema (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A). Little is known about first-order versions of Dummett's LC and related systems and about infinite-valued first-order logics in general. The most famous result (Scarpellini [8] ) in this area is that the infinitevalued first-order Lukasiewicz logic is not recursively axiomatizable.
We arrive at a first-order Gödel logic by taking the truth functions for the propositional connectives and defining truth functions for universal and existential quantifiers as infimum and supremum over the truth values, respectively. It is worth pointing out right away that which logic we get depends crucially on the order type of the set of truth values. In Section 2 we define these logics and describe their differences. The main result of this paper is that a particular Gödel logic G 0 , namely that based on the set of truth values V 0 = 1/k : k ∈ ω \ {0} ∪ {0}, is not recursively axiomatizable. Indeed, already the ∃-free fragment is not r.e. We give the proof in Section 3.
The main interest of Dummett's LC is that it axiomatizes linear intuitionistic Kripke semantics: LC is the set of all propositional formulas valid in all Kripke trees consisting of just one branch. We see that there is a strong connection between infinite-valued Gödel logic and logics based on linearly ordered models. In the first-order case it turns out that the logic defined by linearly ordered Kripke structures and constant domains ILC is exactly the same as G 0 . The logic we get by dropping the requirement that the domains are constant, IL, is arguably the more natural analogue to LC in the first-order case. We obtain the result that the set of validities of IL is not r.e. as a corollary to the result for G 0 (which is equal to ILC).
Other logics based on linearly ordered Kripke structures are, e.g., variants of Kröger's [5] Temporal logic of programs TL. TL is based on the temporal operators 2 (henceforth) and (nexttime) and is characterized by temporal structures order isomorphic to ω. It is known [9, 6, 7] that first-order TL is not axiomatizable. The logic arising from temporal structures that have the form of trees of segments each of which is order-isomorphic to ω is axiomatizable [2] . It has been an open question whether the logic based on chains of segments orderisomorphic to ω is axiomatizable or not. In Section 4 we use the incompleteness result to give a negative answer to this question. We also strengthen the result of [6] : Already first-order TL without is not axiomatizable.
First-order Temporal, Intuitionistic and Gödel Logics
We shall work in a usual language L of predicate logic containing countably many variables (x, y, z, . . . ), function symbols (s, h, . . . ), predicate symbols (P , Q, R, . . . ), connectives (∧, ∨, ⊃, ¬) and the universal (∀) and existential (∃) quantifiers. The language L extended by the temporal operators 2 (henceforth always) and (next time) is denoted L t . The set of (closed) formulas of L resp. L t is denoted Frm(L) resp. Frm(L t ). For a given interpretation K we will also consider extended languages L K where the elements of a given domain are added as constant symbols the interpretation of which is fixed.
We proceed to define Kripke semantics for first-order temporal logics. These logics are all based on discrete time; this reflects their use in theoretical computer science where "time" is taken to be the discrete states of program executions (see [5] ).
Definition 21. Let T be a denumerable partially ordered set. T belongs to the class L of linear discrete orders iff it is order isomorphic to ω; it belongs to the class T of trees if it is order isomorphic to a rooted tree; it belongs to the class G of linear discrete orders with gaps if it is order isomorphic to an ω-chain of ω-segments (i.e., to ω · ω); it belongs to the class B of linear discrete orders with branching gaps iff it is order isomorphic to a rooted tree of ω-segments.
Definition 22. Let W be L, G, or B, and let Frm(L t ) be the set of formulas over some first-order temporal language. A temporal structure K for L t is a tuple T, {D i } i∈T , {s i } i∈T , s , where T ∈ W, D i is a set called the domain at state i,
is a function mapping n-ary predicate symbols to functions from D n i to { , ⊥}, and s is a function mapping n-ary function symbols to functions from
The valuation function s can be extended in the obvious way to a function on all terms.
We define the valuation functions
(
Definition 23. We define the following logics:
s with T ∈ L satisfies A. Linear discrete temporal logic with constant domains TLC is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L t )every K = T, {D i } i∈T , {s i } i∈T , s with T ∈ L and D i = D j for all i, j ∈ T satisfies A. Linear discrete temporal logic with gaps TG is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L t ) s.t. K = T, {D i } i∈T , {s i } i∈T , s with T ∈ G satisfies A. Linear discrete temporal logic with gaps and constant domains TGC is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L t )every K = T, {D i } i∈T , {s i } i∈T , s with T ∈ G and D i = D j for all i, j ∈ T satisfies A. Linear discrete temporal logic with branching gaps TB is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L t ) s.t. K = T, {D i } i∈T , {s i } i∈T , s with T ∈ B satisfies A.
As indicated in the introduction, the logic TL is not axiomatizable. This was shown for the original formulation of Kröger by Szalas [9] and Kröger [6] (two binary function symbols have to be present for the results to hold). If the operator until is also present, or if local variables (i.e., variables whose interpretation may me different for each state) are allowed, then the empty signature suffices, as was shown by Szalas and Holenderski [10] and Kröger [6] , respectively. These results were strengthened and extended in various ways by Merz [7] . In fact, to be precise, Kröger's original formulation TLV differs from TL as defined here in several respects: it has (1) constant domains, (2) rigid predicate symbols (i.e., the interpretation of the predicate symbols is the same for each state) and (3) local variables. Merz [7, Lemma 1] shows that the validity problem for TLC can be reduced to to the validity problem for TLV. Hence, our results extend also to Kröger's original formulation. On the other hand, TB is axiomatizable by a sequent calculus presented in [2] .
Next we give Kripke semantics for various fragments of first-order intuitionistic logic. We use the term "intuitionistic logic" par abus de langage: "Real" intuitionistic logic is defined not via Kripke-or any other semantics but by Heyting's calculi which he extracted from the writings of Brouwer. It is a more recent discovery that one can give Kripke semantics for these logics which are complete for the calculi. This completeness result, however, is of doubtful value from the intuitionistic point of view.
Definition 24. Let Frm(L) be the set of formulas over some first-order language, and let T bei in T or L. An intuitionistic Kripke-structure K for L is a tuple T, {D i } i∈T , {s i } i∈T , s , where D i is a set called the domain at state i,
is a function mapping n-ary predicate symbols to functions from D n i to { , ⊥}, and s is a function mapping n-ary function symbols to func-
The valuation s i has to satisfy a monotonicity requirement:
A is satisfied in an intuitionistic Kripke structure K,
Definition 25. We define the following logics:
As usual, if L is some logic, we write L |= A for A ∈ L. First-order Gödel logics are given by a first-order language, truth functions for the connectives and quantifiers, and a set of truth values. The sets of truth values for the systems we consider are subsets of [0, 1]; the designated truth value is 1. The propositional versions of these logics were originally introduced by Gödel [4] , and have spawned a sizeable area of logical research subsumed under the title "intermediate logics" (intermediate between classical and intuitionistic logic).
Interpretations are defined as usual: n to D. s can be extended in the obvious way to a function on all terms. The valuation for formulas is defined as follows:
The set {I(A(d)) : d ∈ D} is called the distribution of A(x), we denote it by Distr I (A(x)). The quantifiers are, as usual, defined by infimum and supremum of their distributions.
In considering first-order infinite valued logics, care must be taken in choosing the set of truth values. In order to define the semantics of the quantifier we must restrict the set of truth values to those which are closed under infima and suprema. Note that in propositional infinite valued logics this restriction is not required. For instance, the rational interval [0, 1] ∩ Q will not give a satisfactory set of truth values. The following, however, do:
The corresponding infinite-valued Gödel logics are G R , G 0 , and G 1 .
Note that V 0 is order isomorphic to the set of truth values for LC (ω + 1, with 0 designated and reverse order); hence G 0 is the natural generalization of LC to first-order. The corresponding propositional systems all have the same sets of tautologies, as can easily be seen. In other words, propositional infinitevalued logic is independent of the cardinality or order type of the set of truth values. The finite-valued versions are all distinct, however, and in fact LC is the intersection of all finite-valued Gödel logics.
The first-order infinite-valued systems are not equivalent, however.
Proposition 28. Let
) has a minimum (w.r.t. I) and = I((∀y)A(y)) otherwise. Corollary 29. Let C and C be defined as in Proposition 28. Then C is valid in both G 0 and
Proof. C is valid in G 0 because every supremum is a maximum; it is also valid in G 1 because the only supremum which is not a maximum is 1. C is not valid in G 0 because there exists a sequence of truth values converging to 0, having no minimum and I((∀y)A(y)) = 0. In G 1 every infimum is also a minimum and thus C is valid in G 1 . C and C are both nonvalid in G R because -at arbitrary places in the open interval (0, 1) there are infinite (increasing and decreasing) sequences without maximum and minimum.
Note that both C and C are valid in classical logic and not valid in intuitionistic logic. Dummett's formula (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A) is also not valid intuitionistically, but-of course-it is true in all three infinite-valued Gödel logics: Whatever A and B evaluate to, one of them is certainly less than or equal to the other.
Proposition 210. For any first-order formula A, G 0 |= A iff ILC |= A.
Proof. Only if: Let
Note that the monotonicity proviso in the definition of ILC-interpretations implies thatφ(A) is of the form {⊥} n { } ω for some n ∈ ω, or equals {⊥} ω . We can now associate to each ILC-interpretation K a many-valued interpreta-
It is then easily proved, by induction on the complexity of a formula A, that
The only nontrivial induction step is that concerning implication. Suppose 
If, on the other hand, K j (B) = for some j ∈ ω then ϕ K (B) = ϕ K (A ⊃ B). By (IH) we get ϕ K (B) = I K (B) and finally ϕ K (A ⊃ B) = I K (A ⊃ B). This concludes the induction step.
It immediately follows that if ILC |= A then G 0 |= A.
If: Conversely, let I = D, s be a G 0 -interpretation. Let K I = ω, D, {s i } i∈ω , s be given by:
for atomic A, and s according to the interpretation of the function symbols in s. Again by induction on the complexity of formulas we have I(A) = ϕ K I (A), in particular, K I |= i A if I |= m A.
Incompleteness of G 0 , ILC and IL
We proceed to prove that the valid formulas of G 0 are not recursively enumerable. In contrast to this result, all finite-valued Gödel logics are r.e. [1] as well as G R [11] (G R there appears as intuitionistic fuzzy logic).
Proposition 31. Let I be a G 0 -interpretation, A a formula and
Then v = 0 if Distr I (A(x)) has a minimum and v = 1 otherwise.
Proof. Just as in Proposition 28: Suppose Distr I (A(x)) has a minimum v, let d ∈ D be s.t. I(A(d)) = v. Then I(A(d)) = I((∀y)A(y)), so I(¬[A(d) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)]) = 0. Conversely, if Distr I (A(x)) has no minimum, then I((∀y)A(y)) = 0 and I(A(d)) > 0 for all d ∈ D. Hence I(A(d) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)) = 0, and I(¬[A(d) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)]) = 1 for all d ∈ D.
In order to prove the main theorem of this chapter we need some tools from recursion theory.
Definition 32. Let ψ be an effective recursive enumeration of the set PR 1 1 of all primitive recursive functions from ω to ω. We define a two place function ϕ (which enumerates a subclass of PR 
The index set O ϕ is defined as {k : (∀y)ϕ k (y) = 0}.
Proposition 33. The index set O ϕ is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. By definition of ϕ, {k : (∀y)ϕ k (y) = 0} = {k : (∀y)ψ k (y) = 0}. But for every g ∈ PR 1 1 the index set {k : (∀y)ψ k = g} is Π 1 -complete. Therefore O ϕ is Π 1 -complete and thus not recursively enumerable.
The essence of the incompleteness proof is represented by a sequence of formulas (A k ) k∈ω constructed via ϕ s.t.
i.e. O ϕ is m-reducible to the validity problem of G 0 .
Definition 34. Let P be a one-place predicate symbol, s be the function symbol for the successor function and0 be the constant symbol representing 0 (in particular, we choose a signature containing this symbol and all symbols from Robinson's arithmetic Q). Let A 1 be a conjunction of axioms strong enough to represent every recursive function (e.g. the axioms of Q) and a defining axiom for the function ϕ s.t. every atomic formula is negated or doubly negated. We define the formulas A 2 , A are not classical in the sense that they may assume truth values between 0 and 1. I(A k 4 ) = 1 means (according to the ⊃-semantics of G 0 ) that for all x with ϕ k (x) = 0, I(P (0)) is less or equal to I(P (x)).
Proof. 
If I(P (0)) = 1 then clearly I(A k ) = 1. Thus let us assume that I(P (0)) < 1. As I(B k ) < 1 we must have I(A 
For such a d we either have (I(P (d)) ≤ I(P (s(d))) and I(P (s(d))) < 1) or I(P (0)) < I(P (s(d)) ). In the latter case we get I(P (s(d)) ⊃ P (0)) = I(P (0)). Thus in any case ( * ) gets a value ≤ I(P (0)) and I(B k ) ≤ I(P (0)). Again we obtain I(A k ) = 1.
Theorem 36. The ∃-free fragment of G 0 is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. We show that G 0 |= A k iff k ∈ O ϕ (i.e. iff for all x, ϕ k (x) = 0). The sequence (A k ) k∈ω is ∃-free and (trivially) r.e. Thus a recursive enumeration of all A k with G 0 |= A k would give a recursive enumeration of the set O ϕ which, by Proposition 33, does not exist. Now let us assume that G 0 |= A k . We define a specific G 0 -interpretation N k : The domain of N k is the set of natural numbers ω and the evaluation function s for the atoms is defined by:
For all other atoms A we set s(A) = 1 if N |= A and s(A) = 0 otherwise (N |= A means that A is true in the standard model N). Note that P (0) receives the value 
By Proposition 31 the last property only holds if Distr N k (P (x)) does not have a minimum. We show now that ϕ k must be the constant function 0. We assume that there exists a number r s.t. ϕ k (r) = 0 and derive a contradiction: By definition of s we obtain s(P (s
what implies that for all number terms (i.e. successor terms) s p (0) with p ≥ r the formula ¬[ϕ k (s p (0)) = 0] evaluates to 1. As A 1 represents ϕ we obtain ϕ k (p) = 0 for all p ≥ r and, by definition of ϕ k , ϕ k (p) = 1 for all p ≥ r. By definition of s we thus obtain
2 . Therefore Distr N k (P (x)) has a minimum; a contradiction. Note that by the choice of the standard model N we only have standard elements in our domain (i.e. elements which are represented by successor terms). So there cannot be another sequence in the set Distr N k (P (x)) which converges to 0. We infer that ϕ k must be identical to 0, and so k ∈ O ϕ .
For the other direction let us assume that k ∈ O ϕ , i.e. ϕ k (n) = 0 for all n. As A 1 represents ϕ the formula [ϕ k (s (0)) = 0] is provable for all ∈ ω. Now let I be an arbitrary G 0 -interpretation of A k . If I(B k ) < 1 then, by Lemma 35, I(A k ) = 1. Thus it remains to investigate the case I(B k ) = 1. By definition of B k , I(B k ) = 1 implies I(A k 5 ) = 1. We substitute all ground terms s n (0) into the matrix of A k 5 . These instances are true in I either if all P (s n (0)) evaluate to 1 (in which case A k is true because also P (0) is true) or the sequence I(P (s n (0)) n∈ω is strictly decreasing. In the last case the sequence must converge to 0. By the axiom A 2 no element of this sequence is actually = 0; this property also holds for all (potential) nonstandard elements, which may be present as the domain is arbitrary. As a consequence Distr I (P (x)) does not have a minimum. Proposition 31 then implies that
But the last formula occurs disjunctively in the consequent of A k and thus I |= m A k . Putting things together we see that A k evaluates to 1 under all G 0 -interpretations, i.e., G 0 |= A k .
Corollary 37.
(1) ILC is not recursively enumerable.
(2) IL is not recursively enumerable.
So suppose that ϕ k (n) = 0 for all n ∈ ω. Let K = ω, (D i ) i∈ω , {s i } i∈ω , s be an IL-interpretation. Then, by definition of the formulas A k and B k , K 0 (B k ) = ⊥ implies K 0 (A k ) = . It remains to investigate the case K 0 (B k ) = .
All domains D i of K must contain the interpretation of the number terms s n (0). Therefore either K 0 (P (0)) = , in which case K 0 (A k ) = 1 by definition of A k , or (by the proof of Theorem 36) the sequence ϕ K (P (s n (0))) n∈ω is strictly decreasing. Note that we may define ϕ K andφ K exactly like in Proposition 210 (although K need not be an ILC-interpretation).
So let us assume that ϕ K (P (s n (0))) n∈ω is strictly decreasing. We will show thatφ K ((∀x)P (x)) = {⊥} ω . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that ϕ K ((∀x)P (x)) = {⊥} ω , i.e. there exists an i ∈ ω s.t. K i ((∀x)P (x)) = ⊥. As (∀x)P (x) does not contain function symbols, K i ((∀x)P (x)) cannot be undefined and so K i ((∀x)P (x)) = . By definition of the IL-semantics this implies that for all j ≥ i and d ∈ D j , K j (P (d/x)) = . In particular, we get
As D i contains the interpretation of all number terms we also obtain K i (P (s n (0))) = for all n ∈ ω. Consequently min{j : K j (P (s n (0))) = } ≤ i for all n ∈ ω. By definition of ϕ K we thus obtain
This however contradicts our assumption that the sequence ϕ K (P (s n (0))) n∈ω is strictly decreasing. So we obtainφ K ((∀x)P (x)) = {⊥} ω . However, there are no i and d ∈ D i s.t. K i (P (d/x)) = ⊥, since K 0 ((∀x)¬¬P (x)) = by A 2 in B k . Therefore K i (P (d/x) ⊃ (∀y)P (y)) = ⊥ for all i ∈ ω and d ∈ D i . By the semantics of IL this implies
But then K 0 (A k ) = and the reduction of O ϕ to IL is completed.
Incompleteness of temporal logics
We now proceed to show that (a) -free TL and TLC and (b) TG and TGC are also not recursively axiomatizable. This strengthens the incompleteness result for TL of Szalas and Kröger [6] and answers a question left open in [2] . In contrast to TG, however, TB is r.e. [2] . An axiomatization is given by adding to first-order S4 the axioms:
and the rule A/ A.
Definition 41. We define the operator Ψ as follows:
Proposition 42. Let A be an ∃-free first-order formula. Then
Proof. Suppose IL |= A, let K = ω, D i , {s i }, s be a countermodel. We can interpret K as a TL-interpretation K t . By induction on the complexity of a formula A and using the monotonicity property of K we have (2(A) ). Again, by an easy induction on the complexity of A we have K The reader will note the similarity between the above embedding of IL in TL with Gödel's, and McKinsey and Tarski's embeddings of intuitionistic predicate logic into S4.
In contrast to first order TL, propositional TL is axiomatizable (even with ). In [5] it is shown that we get TL prop by adding to TB prop the rule
Definition 44. The set S * (A) of strict subformulas of a formula A is defined as follows:
Let P 1 , . . . , P m be the predicate symbols with occurring in A with arities r 1 , . . . , r m andx r1 , . . . ,x rm corresponding variable vectors. Then we define
Definition 45. Let A be a first-order formula without ∃. Define
Let TG * be the logic based on TG-interpretations where the domains within an ω-sequence are equal, i.e., for all i, j we have
. This is immediately seen for A atomic or with outermost logical symbol a propositional connective. If A ≡ (∀x)B(x) we argue as follows: Let TG * * (TGC * * ) be the logic based on TG(TGC)-interpretations where the worlds within an ω-sequence are equal, i.e., for all i, j we have D i,j = D i,0 and s i,j = s i,0 .
Proposition 47. Let A be a and ∃-free formula.
(1) TGC * |= C A ⊃ A iff TGC * * |= C A ⊃ A. (2) TG * |= C A ⊃ A iff TG * * |= C A ⊃ A.
Proof. Obvious, since A does not contain .
Proposition 48. Let A be an -and ∃-free formula.
(1) TGC * * |= C A ⊃ A iff TLC |= A. If: Suppose TGC * * |= C A ⊃ A, let K = ω · ω, D, {s i }, s be a countermodel. Since K |= C A and the domains are constant, K j,k (A) = K j, (A) for A, and in particular s j,k = s j, . Define K = ω, D, {s i }, s by s j = s jω for j ∈ ω. Again by induction on the complexity of A it is easily shown that K j (A) = K j,k (A). So K |= t A.
(2) Similarly.
Corollary 49. The ∃-free fragments of TG and TGC are not r.e.
Proof. By Corollary 43 and Propositions 46, 47 and 48.
For an axiomatization of the propositional logic TG prop it is convenient to introduce a new connective defined by K i,j ( A) = 1 iff K i+1,0 (A) = 1. Then TG prop is axiomatized by S4 plus 
Conclusion
We used the main result of this paper, the incompleteness of the infinitely valued first-order Gödel logic based on the domain of truth values V 0 : {1/k : k ≥ 1}∪{0}, to demonstrate the incompleteness of first-order discrete linear temporal logics with/without time gaps and with/without constant domains. The firstorder discrete branching time logic with time gaps, however, is complete, but it is an open question whether the same applies for the same logic with constant domains. The infinitely valued first-order Gödel logics define another field of future research; we conjecture that the logic based on V 1 = {1−1/k : k ≥ 1}∪{1} and the ∃-fragment of the Gödel logic based on V 0 are recursively axiomatizable.
